1 As there has been an ever lasting debate on the exact meaning of the terms "emotion", "feeling", "sentiment", "passion", "affect" in psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and political science, for the sake of brevity I shall use treat them as equivalent. Of course, there are differences between them emanating from differences in the semantic fields, the different periods in the paradigmatic development of each single discipline (Shott 1979 , Kemper 1987 , Oatley & Jenkins 1996 . As a working definition, by "emotion" (or feeling) I shall mean the arousal of the human organism, which induces readiness for action and evaluations of objects, relations and situations within a definite time context, and whose the subject is aware of without necessarily being able to name it.
-2 -Nicolas Demertzis instrumental and neutral-procedural conception of politics, a popular view at the end of the 60s as well as today (Habermas 1970 , Mouffe 2000 b) the supremacy of "interest" as opposed to "passion" as an explaining factor of political action, already in effect in the middle of the 18 th century (Hirschman 2003) ; c) the, for many years, dominance of rational choice paradigm in a very large number of political science departments in the USA and Europe, in the context of which emotions are either conceived as irrational elements or are taken as objective traits which do not affect the actor"s, by definition, "rational" thinking (Barbalet 1998 : 29ff, Williams 2001 ).
d) The mistreatment of emotions even in the political cultural paradigm, the great rival of rational choice (Barry 1970 , Eckstein 1988 , due to the prevalence of quantitative methodologies according to which the affective dimension has been shrunken into a numeric item or variable.
A possible "political sociology of emotions" should, however, differentiate itself from an alleged "emotive political sociology". This is so because the latter would reduce, in a monistic way, political phenomena to emotions and feelings. On the contrary, the former would explicitly integrate the emotional perspective in its examination of political phenomena. But the possible establishment of a political sociology of emotions is not self-evident, even if the academic community was to make such a demand. This is so because any political sociology of emotions could not possibly break away from the general field of political sociology, as happened in the case of the sociology of emotions. Paradoxically, the "political sociology of emotions"
should be coterminous with political sociology (whatever that may mean). The political sociology of emotions is none "other" than its originary scientific discipline (that is, political sociology). The difference probably consists in the "affective filter"
Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -3 -Nicolas Demertzis through which each political sociology will from now on examine its objects. This is what I will try to do myself in the rest of this article, analyzing Greek populism on the basis of the feeling of ressentiment.
On ressentiment
As opposed to most other feelings, ressentiment and/or "resentment" has been sufficiently analyzed (Barbalet 1998: 63) so as prominent scholars to argue that the politics of late modernity is a politics of generalized ressentiment as the uncertainties of capitalism and the surveillance of the state create in the individuals a diffuse sense of powerlessness, the public expression of which is not positive and self-grounded praxis but a hasty and dependent reaction which usually takes the form of "identity politics" and ethicism (Brown 1995 : 21-76, Connolly 1991 . The concept was introduced by Nietzsche"s philosophy in 1887 (Genealogy of Morals) and since then it found its way into the works of many other philosophers, sociologists and psychologists. It"s no wonder then that there is no general consensus as to it"s meaning; by and large, I would say that in the relevant bibliography there are two kinds of uses of the notion: the "nietzschean" and the "non nietzschean" 2 . According to the former, ressentiment is a feeling of the weak who follow in general the logic of La Fontaine"s fox. According to the latter, resentment signifies emotional opposition to unequal and unjust situations.
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In this section we will discuss the views of sociologists and philosophers who use the concept in the first and the second ways. Special emphasis will be accorded to Max Scheler"s analysis, since in the next section it will be used for the interpretation of Greek populism.
The non nietzschean approaches
The British philosopher of language Peter Frederick Strawson gave particular emphasis to the concept of resentment, placing his analysis within a wider moral approach to human sociability. In their interactions, people make relationships invested with feeling, so that it matters for somebody someone else"s opinion about, and behavior towards, him. The importance of others for the construction of the self is expressed in emotionally laden "reactive attitudes".
In his approach, then, resentment is the negative reactive attitude that a person develops in the face of another person"s indifference, insult and injury towards him (1974: 7, 14) . Strawson uses a simple example: if someone accidentally steps on my hand as he helps me do something, the pain may be no less than if he did it on purpose in a gesture of contempt towards my person. But while in the latter case I would feel deep resentment, in the former I might as well feel gratitude in the light of his good intent. As a negative reactive attitude, resentment implies a disapproval of the injurer and is considered responsible for his actions with good reason. Strawson thinks that towards a small child, a mentally deficient person, a drug-addicted criminal or a sick man, who causes us some sort of injury, small or big-it makes no difference, we cannot feel resentment. This feeling presupposes moral responsibility. Ending our reference to his views on resentment, what puzzles us is his selfconfessed looseness in the appellation of the negative and unpleasant feelings he describes as "resentment" and "indignation". Strawson writes (1974: 14) John Rawls (1971 Rawls ( /1991 also uses the concept of resentment, which he defines as a "moral sentiment", in about the same way. In fact, he incorporates it in an absolutely organic way into his theory of justice, as "moral sentiments" constitute the necessary condition for every rational individual to realize, behind the supposed "veil of ignorance", the two basic principles of justice as fairness: (1) every person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (1971/1991: 60, 83, 250) . These two principles, ranked in lexical order, cannot be applied if individuals are not governed by an immanent, as well as an acquired, sense of justice and moral sentiments. Moral sentiments are defined as families of dispositions and propensities regulated by a higher-order desire (1971/1991: 192) which touch on the very sociability of man (and here Rawls is not diverging from the classical philosophical tradition): relations of love and trust between children and parents, trust and sympathy between friends, the love of humanity, adherence to a common good. Moreover, «they presuppose an understanding and an acceptance of certain principles and an ability to judge in accordance with them» (1971/1991: 487) .
According to the above criteriology, Rawls, in almost the whole eighth chapter of his book, makes distinctions between moral and non-moral sentiments: anger, rancor, anxiety, envy, spite, jealousy, annoyance and grudgingness are not moral sentiments primarily because in their manifestation and explanation the individual does not presuppose a binding sense of justice and injustice. Together with guilt, shame, trust, indignation, obligation, infidelity, deceit and sympathy, resentment, for Rawls, is placed among the moral sentiments. He defines it (1971/1991: 484) , and then, as a sentiment, which arises when, wrongs are done to us.
Jack Barbalet (1998) , moving in the field of the sociology of emotions, handles the concept of resentment with particular care since he links it to wide ranging social and political phenomena, such as inter-class and intra-class antagonism, social inequality and citizenship. In his analysis he draws many arguments mainly from the work of T.
H. Marshall and he points out that the antagonistic context of a class society generates a multiplicity of emotions and feelings, contrasting and/or complementing one another. But he thinks that resentment in particular is a critically important feeling in a class society characterized by horizontal and vertical mobility (1998: 68) . It is precisely this feeling that allows for the conversion of a structural-class contradiction to a class conflict, to real action in the public space.
In a first reading, resentment for Barbalet is the negative and unpleasant feeling that somebody is enjoying one or more privileges in an improper and unequal way.
This makes for the accompanying feeling of indignation against inequality, which is the catalyst for the inter and intra-class antagonism, something which is not Nicolas Demertzis sufficiently stressed out in the bibliography on class and class contradictions 3 .
Resentment is directed not towards power but towards the normative content of the social order, in the sense that someone: 1) judges unworthy the position that someone else has in the social hierarchy and 2) thinks that someone else-a person or a collective agent-deprives him of chances or privileges that he himself could enjoy (1998: 68, 137) .
For the Australian sociologist, (class) resentment is an active feeling determined by the specificity of each social structure, determining afterwards in its turn the intensity of the class struggle (1998: 71).
Nietzschean approaches
In the paradigmatic non-nietzschean approaches I just referred to resentment is an unpleasant feeling that leads to an active posture. On the contrary, the nietzschean approaches I am going to discuss right away, resentment qua ressentiment is linked to passivity. Those who subscribe to these approaches adhere to the nietzschean view of ressentiment as a morality of the weak creatures «who have been forbidden of the real reaction, of the act» (Nietzsche, 1970: 35) . In the German philosopher"s thought, the resentful man is governed by a frightened baseness that appears as humility, his submission to those he hates becomes docility, his weakness is supposedly transformed to patience or even virtue. The basic characteristic of Nietzsche"s resentful man is vindictiveness in disguise that leads to inaction (133). The main representative of the nietzschean approach is, of course, Max Scheler (1874 Scheler ( -1928 ).
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Other representatives include Werner Sombart (1913 Sombart ( /1998 and Robert Merton. (1957 /1968 Finally, the third sufficient condition is the irrevocable nature of the injustice you feel subjected to. Each particular injustice, from which the revengeful attitude begins, has to be experienced as destiny, as something that cannot be changed in any way.
So, it is through the combination of these sufficient and necessary conditions that schelerian ressentiment unfolds. When these conditions are absent we cannot speak of ressentiment in the proper, technical, meaning of the word.
As to the intrapersonal processes which characterize the resentful man, Scheler"s theses follow the nietzschean line, which he extends even further. He believes that the resentful attitude leads to a reversal of values. Since the resentful man does not possess the moral virtues and the psychological abilities (for example, faith, high selfesteem, sublimation mechanisms) nor the social resources to manage the pressure his inferior social position exerts on him-but also the ever present existential anxiety (pp. 52)-, he proceeds to a chronic withdrawal to himself, thus avoiding to act out his revengeful attitude. In this way, says Scheler, he morally poisons himself. While at first he admires the values and privileges he does not possess (prestige, education, wealth, descent, beauty, youth, etc.), because he cannot acquire them, he goes on to invalidate them, valuing the exact opposites. Since ressentiment is not rage or hatred which have an expiry date and a specific addressee, but is instead a chronic and complex emotional disposition with unclear recipients which is molded by the endless rumination of repressed negative affective reactions, it entails a reversal of values, so that the person can stand and handle his frustrations. At first I admire the wealthy, the handsome, the aristocrat, the educated, the famous, etc. But since, by definition, I cannot become like them or compete with them, there is a silent hostility growing in me, a repressed vindictiveness for something that was unrightfully taken away from me. So, I start slowly to undervalue what I once admired. In psychoanalytic terms, we would say that it is a reaction formation, a defense mechanism against pressures exerted on the psyche. Of course, on a purely individual level, this transvaluation is a sort of self-therapy for Scheler 4 . However, the German sociologist focuses on the study of social and cultural phenomena and, because of that, he believes that the resentful mentality (or emotional climate) changes the whole cultural value system as well as the way in which we cope with power, knowledge, historical memory, social evolution, social hierarchy and so on.
Scheler goes beyond Nietzsche maintaining that the reversal of values does not mean that in real time the resentful man is conscious of the positivity of the values he contends. It is not about a "rational self-interested" attitude. Ultimately, the resentful man is not the rational, and yet impotent, actor who reacts according to the logic of the "sour grapes" seething with bitterness. But it has nothing to do with cynicism either. It"s not as if the resentful man knew and recognized the values but acts as if he didn"t (that is, he knows and accepts education as an end in itself, but since he cannot be educated himself he devalues it placing in its stead the spontaneity, lets say, of the common man). But nor is the hypocrit a model for the resentful man, since the latter does not pretend to reverse the values (pp. 77).
What Scheler means by resentful "transvaluation", is literally a substitution: the old values stay in the back stage of the psyche, in a misty landscape of the soul, so that the resentful man cannot see them as he operates within another level of values, which he has elevated to a positive normative context. The positive values are still felt as 4 Recently, in psychoanalytic terms, Simon Clarke (2004) proposed that ressentiment can be thought for the societal level as to what envy is for the individual; i.e. as a destructive emotion which damage future generations to the extend that it represents pure negativity. Clarke refers to the Kleinean conception of envy, which is a projection of Thanatos and "reminiscent of Nietzschean ressentiment" (p. 106). Where not transvaluation being central to Nietzsche"s, let alone to Scheler"s, argumentation I could agree with Clarke"s insight. Yet, it seems to me that the Nietzschean version of ressentiment cannot be equated with envy; rather, as a negative and complex feeling it contains and somehow submerges envy as long as perpetual powerlessness and relived inferiority block open destructive action or malicious expressions. Transvaluation, then, tames and modulates envy and, in that sense, although ressentiment is reactive it is not primarily destructive.
-12 -Nicolas Demertzis such, but they are overcast by the false ones (pp. 60); it is a matter of an obscure awareness of true values which Scheler calls "value blindness" or "value delusion" (pp. 59). Psychoanalytically, I would say that we are dealing with the result of a "splitting" due to an intense narcissistic trauma, which displaces and/or negates the object of desire. For Scheler, the resentful man may be honest but he is also valually mutated.
Towards an appraisal
In our presentation of nietzschean and non-nietzschean approaches to "resentment" it was revealed, first, that it is an annoying and unpleasant moral feeling; second, their common reference point was the lived experience of injustice and, third, that their fundamental differentiating element was the articulation of this moral feeling with an active or a passive attitude respectively. It is this difference that determines the gap as to the conceptual substance of the term. Linked to inactivity, "resentment" is defined a la Nietzsche and Scheler, i.e. as ressentiment. Even if, as Barbalet (1998: 63) and Meltzer & Musolf (2002) argue, we do not generally have to hypostasize, freeze and reify the content of the concepts, I do not find reasonable enough causes to abandon the conceptual substance of "ressentiment" as a terminus technicus. Since we have the concept of moral or righteous indignation" (nemesis) and rage, linked to activity, already from Aristotle, they could well stay in usage in sociological (and ethicophilosophical) analysis without burdening ressentiment with a meaning it never had. Meltzer & Musolf (2002: 242-3, 251) think of ressentiment as a persisting moral feeling induced by being insulted, affronted, or deprived (general sense) and linked with vengeful desires that cannot be readily consummated; they differentiate it from "resentment" (specific sense) which is a transitory feeling caused by relatively Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -13 -Nicolas Demertzis minor insults. The difference, hence, between the two concepts is a difference of degree. In their analysis ressentiment is not linked to passivity; on the contrary they see it as a potential source of individual and collective action and social change, departing, therefore, from Nietzsche"s and Scheler"s conceptualization. The problem with their account is that they do reify the emotion they deal with; first, they seem to forget that emotions are experienced in a flow and they come and go, spark and pale within certain social situations. So, it is not ressentiment per se that is linked to social action and transformation; it is the transformation of the social milieu which may modify ressentiment into anger, rage or any other activity-laden emotion. Second, they understate the role of transvaluation in the constitution of ressentiment, especially in its Schelerian version. Yet, it is transvaluation itself which makes for the passivity which characterizes the emotion and for the distinction of ressentiment from cynicism, envy, and rancor 5 .
All in all, then, as the German word Schadenfreude cannot be translated to other European languages-except perhaps to Greek, as equivalent to "χαιρεκακία" (in the sense that someone is glad that someone else rightfully suffers) 6 -, ressentiment, as a technical term, should be kept untranslated and "resentment" should be taken as synonymous to moral indignation, bitterness, pique, rage and moral anger (Bittner 1994). Distinguishing thus ressentiment from resentment is not scholastic but crucial in understanding and describing different aspects of seemingly uniform social and 5 Turning upside down Nietzsche"s notion, Solomon (1994) claims that transvaluation qua passivity is a strategy of the will to power specific for the weak. Consequently, powerlessness is not seen as a cause of ressentiment but as an outer manifestation of the weaks" eagerness to take revenge in their own terms, as an expression of their own will to power. For Solomon ressentiment is the ever most clever and life-preserving emotion of the slave in his confrontation with the master. 6 Emphasis should be placed here on "rightly", on the sense of justice that accompanies the vindictive joy one experiences facing the sufferings of a third person ("he went for it", "he should have watched his step"). If there weren"t for the dimension of justice we would be dealing simply with grudgingness. For a sharp-witted analysis of Schadenfreude, see John Portman (2000) .
political phenomena. In the analysis of Greek populism which I will attempt later, this distinction will be put forward.
So, I assign ressentiment as an unpleasant moral feeling without specific addressees, which operates as a chronic reliving of repressed and endless vindictiveness, hostility, envy and indignation due to the impotence of the subject in expressing them, resulting, at the level of values, in the negation of what he unconsciously desires.
Populism: a political phenomenon charged with ressentiment
Populism can, on the one hand, be studied jointly as a political discourse, as an ideology, as a movement, as a regime, as a practice, as a code or a syndrome (Wiles 1969) , as a dimension of political culture (Worsley 1969: 245) and, on the other hand, it can be analysed together with other relevant political phenomena such as, primarily, nationalism, fascism, racism, revolutions, revolts, socio-economic development, etc 7 .
Nearly all interpretations of populism, include the affective factor only in a disguised or implicit way. Even though none of its interpreters would be willing to neglect this factor, few are those who approached it in a systematic way, the others depending on its "commonsensical", allusive and elusive presence. A concrete problematization of feelings, within the analysis of populism, is almost absent because for many years they did not receive particular attention within the general context of sociological analysis.
Often, emotions and feelings are used in a metonymic way. That is, the analysis of each particular populism is carried out through the use of general affective categories Nicolas Demertzis and not through the interpretation of concrete feelings. The concrete and particular feelings are hidden beneath the generalities of the "subjective" dimension of the phenomenon. For example, it has been argued that the "discontent" of the agricultural and lower middle class strata caused by the enforcement of the economic policies and institutions of the political system, as well as by the "antipathy" and "alienation" they felt towards the power elites (Hennessy 1969 : 29, 46, Taggart 2000 , contributed to the appearance of North American and Latin American populism. But "discontent", "alienation" and "antipathy" are general affective categories, which may cover a wide range of specific feelings such as, for example, hatred, rage, indignation, sorrow, etc.
In the interpretation of Russian populism (but not restricted to it) the romantic idealization of the agricultural community and the myth of "the people" are referred to as being central analytic categories (Walicki 1969 : 79, Taggart 2000 . However, these are mechanisms producing imaginary constructions, which only indirectly refer to "actual" feelings, which are their "raw material": joy, hope, nostalgia, admiration, pride, exultation, etc. Likewise, usually, when the imaginary element of populist movements is mentioned, in the sense of a collective identification founded on the redoubled multiplication of the subjects" Ego Ideal, or even when what is discussed is the appellation itself, that is, the master signifier of "the people", through which popular-class interpellations are activated (Worsley 1969 : 244, Laclau 1977 : 143-198, 2004 ), we get the impression that the emphasis is placed on the description of the identificatory mechanisms and not on the concomitant feelings supporting them.
As I mentioned earlier, apart from the metonymic there are also incomplete uses of feelings in the analysis of populism. This is the case in the notion of a "mythical heartland", which Taggart (2000: 95-8, 117 ) considers to be a necessary element of populism. But apart from its imaginary substance, Taggart does not clarify the Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -16 -Nicolas Demertzis affective content of this notion. This is also the case with the notion of a "populist mood" put forward by Canovan (1999) as a fundamental ingredient of populist movements. For this distinguished theorist of the populist phenomenon, populist politics cannot but be based on "heightened emotions" for charismatic leaders, "enthusiasm" and spontaneity. This is not so only for the historical cases of reactionary populism (nazism, bonapartism, etc.), but also for the "healthy" populisms, which appear in western democracies and aim at the "redemptive revival" of politics, beyond the managerial and pragmatic style of governing. But apart from this general call, Canovan does not attempt a specification of the populist emotional "mood".
Recently, in his attempt to encapsulate the populist Zeitgeist in contemporary western democracies Cas Mudde (2004: 547, 557, 560) does not do justice to the affective dimension of populism as he makes only three references to political resentment, charismatic leadership and the growing anger of the silent majority in connection with Taggart"s idea of "heartland".
Of course, the question that arises is: why is that so? Why is the affective factor in the theoretical analysis of populism barely discussed, while its function is so important especially in the cases of "protest" and "identitarian populism" (Taguieff 1995) ? I believe that besides the general negligence of feelings in sociological analysis referred to above, this is due to the fact that many theorists which have dealt and still deal with this issue adopt a more abstract-generalizing and macroscopic level than the micro-scale level of emotions and feelings. Microanalysis, as is well known, may demand qualitative methodological tools as well, but these are different from those of the macroscopic approach: discourse analysis, interviews, etc. So, by studying populism at the level of social structures using a historical sociological approach and comparative analysis, the affective dimension is necessarily put aside. However, the need for closing the gap between the macro and micro-analytical levels has been long noted (Giddens 1984 : 139-144, Turner 1987 and the study of populism should be no exception. In fact, this closing of the gap is facilitated by the sociological study of emotions since it precisely combines subjective action with social structures. I must say that focusing on feelings as well in the study of populism, what is of interest is not the psycho-somatic etiology of individual attitudessomething that William James (1902 James ( /1999 would call "medical materialism"-, but their inter-individual intellectual and moral importance. In other words, the particular interest in the study of emotions lies in the fullest in situ understanding of the meaning (or meanings) of each populism. Kenneth Minogue underlined this early on (1969: 197) , without however finding many to follow his example: «To understand the (populist) movement is to discover the feelings which moved people».
This means that there is not one but many, though interrelated, feelings in effect that permit the existence of populism as a practice, a movement, a party and a regime. All the more so since populist ideological discourse (or/and code/style) is articulated with other ideologies and constantly adapts to various political, religious and social environments (Taggart 2000 : 2-4, 55, Taguieff 1995 . In the context of particular populisms, which flourish in particular national political cultures, then, one can easily find a wide range of feelings, which include nostalgia, angst, helplessness, hatred, vindictiveness, ecstasy, melancholy, anger, fear, indignation, envy, spite and resentment. Minogue mentions some of the above (1969: 197, 206, 207) . Edward Shils (1956) used specifically the feeling of resentment in order to interpret the American political scene of the 1950s, which we will also use to explain Greek populism after the political changeover. But the American sociologist"s analysis was also aiming at a more general theoretical evaluation of populism as a social and political phenomenon. So, one of his points was that populism is «an ideology of resentment against the social establishment imposed by the long-term domination of a class, which is considered to have the monopoly of power, property and civilization».
In his analysis, Shils thought of resentment in terms of moral rage and indignation. In his attempt to explain the emergence and the chances of the far right European populist parties during the period 1990-2000 (i.e. FPÖ, Ny Demokrati, Republikaner, Front Nationale, Schweizer Volkspartei, Lega Nord, Vlaams Blok, ect)
Hans-Georg Betz uses the concept of resentment. He states (1994: 198-200 ) that in the early phase of their appearance they were greatly buttressed by the defuse grievances of working and lower middle class electorate against globalization, the immigrants, the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, politicians" corruption and so on.
Thus they can be seen as a result of the mobilization of ressentiments. Persuasive his argument as it may be, however, his use of ressentiment is quite inconclusive as he oscillates between a nietzschean and a non-nietzschean conception. Definitely, ressentiment in the schelerian sense does not lead to mobilization as it explains political inaction rather than political action. It is "resentment", meaning moral anger and indignation, which may explain better the initial phase of populist mobilization.
Contrary to Betz, I think that ressentiment can be used not for the interpretation of this phase but for the understanding of the emotional climate, which preceded it long ago.
Greek populism in the constellation of ressentiment
From the end of the 70s onwards, probably reaching its peak in the 5-year period from 1989 to 1993, populism in general and Greek populism in particular began to attract the strong interest of the Greek political sociologists. In his well-known text, Wiles isolated twenty-four elements that comprise, in his opinion, the populist code. These elements stem from the fundamental assumption that "virtue" is on the side of the traditions of the common people (Wiles 1969: 166) . Of course it is not necessary that all these elements should coexist in each and every movement or political project in order for it to be characterized as populist. Particular combinations depending on the circumstances, the political culture and the international environment could well demonstrate the populist nature of a movement, party or project as long as the All these are inscribed in the wider context of Greek political culture in the medium and long dureé, as well as in the particularities of the Greek social formation ("spurious modernization", semi-periphery, etc.) and they cannot but presuppose and ignite various feelings. For example, nostalgia is a feeling that causes and is caused by Greek populism. This feeling must be understood in terms of the special relation of populism to tradition. In either case, for developing as well as for developed countries, populism arises as an indirect answer to problems that are brought by the consequences of modernization (Stewart 1969: 180-1) . These consequences involve tensions or/and crises that stem, on the one hand, from the position of a country in the international division of labor and symbolic capital and, on the other, from social, peripheral, inter-class and intra-class inequalities in its interior. This explains why populist phenomena are not only observed in semi-peripheral societies but in the societies of the center as well (Mouzelis 1985) . Sentimentally, crises of this sort are coped with frequently by nostalgic uses of the past.
The Greek case can be easily placed within the context of semi-peripheral populisms where the masses are integrated into the political system through vertical Nicolas Demertzis incorporation and mobilization which is based on the logic of equivalence, as opposed to the horizontal (class) type of integration which is founded on the logic of difference and the articulation of various partial interests (Mouzelis 1985) . In this context ressentiment is transformed into a material force, which in the post-civil war Greece incited populism as a movement and a discourse. To make this clear, we have to recall some of the structural characteristics of Greek society during the thirty year period from 1950 to 1980:
Post-war populism is, as I said before, a petit bourgeois political phenomenon par excellence. The sound presence of petit bourgeois strata has always been a structural feature of the Greek social formation. In fact, during the whole of the twentieth century, due to their social ambivalence and inner dissimilarities, these strata were at one time adopting conservative-authoritarian political attitudes and preferences while at other times they opted for radical alternatives. Immediately after the Second World War and the Civil War, there was an increase in the number and special social significance of the petit bourgeois strata. Within fifteen years a rural exodus of enormous proportions towards the great urban centers took place, especially towards Athens and Salonica, which together absorbed the 65% of the transferred (Karapostolis 1984: 109) . A very significant part, if not the most significant, of the transferred farmers was absorbed in the wider public sector. Many manual laborers were occupied in the construction industry, others were incorporated into "free" retailing professions and relatively few into the productive economic sectors (Lyrintzis 1987 (Lyrintzis , 1993 . For most of them, then, the rural exodus meant a course of upward social mobility, since the place of the poor farmer was exchanged for that of the "multivalent" petit bourgeois, often implicated in networks of political patronage.
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But all these came with a price. The rapid geographical and social mobility, as the one that happened in the particular context of "deformed capitalism" and "authoritarian modernization", made social identities fluid and strengthened the traditional, pre-modern, individualism as well as the informality of the institutional and normative environment (Karapostolis 1987: 38-40) . If the petit bourgeois strata in general experience a floating social identity anyway, the newly formed petit bourgeois strata in Greece of the 50s and 60s in particular, precisely because of their rapid emergence and the malfunctioning of the political and economic systems (state of emergency, clientelistic networks, gray-economy, etc.), experience even more pressure and uncertainty. "Success" and "recognition" are always in doubt, undermined by an imperceptible threat of misappropriation, while everything appears to happen in an "impenetrable" and saturated social environment (Karapostolis 1985: 52, 86ff ).
This means that there is a gap between objective economic success and its subjective perception.
But besides, and next to, the emotional costs of the permanent excitation, uncertainty, rivalry and the active-hostile attitude towards things, for an important, perhaps the most important, part of the petit bourgeois strata there was also another cost: the fear caused by the repressive apparatuses of the post-civil war state. This was so because the first wave of the domestic migration had primarily «political motives and was constituted mainly from EAMite 9 people who could no longer stay at the provinces» (Filias 1976: 62) . These were the civil war"s defeated, thousands of leftwingers who were morally cancelled, politically marginalized, socially stigmatized and personally exhausted, forced to find refuge in the city. For them, as well as for their immediate descendants, defeat functioned as a "cultural trauma", as a painful -22 -Nicolas Demertzis event whose retroactive processing in memory and discourse causes disruptions and reconstructions in a group"s collective identity 10 . Essentially, there was no place for left-wingers in the public sphere, who were treated as second-class citizens. Their political marginalization caused them fear, anger, embarrassment and angst.
Essentially, until the end of the 50s, the space for any strongly worded discourse challenging the post-civil war establishment was extremely narrow. But since the beginning of the crucial decade of the 60s that space is widened as, on the one hand, the "Union of the Center" party (Ένωση Κέντρου) challenges the dominance of ERE (the right-wing dominant party) and, on the other, the economic development in the tertiary and manufacturing sector allows for the massive and very fast accession of the domestic migrants to the labor market. There existed, however, an unbridgeable contradiction: while economic incorporation continues and creates the conditions for social consensus and the gradual de-EAMification of the petit bourgeois masses (Haralambis 1989: 196) , the structure of the post-civil war state (palace, army, national-mindedness, etc.) did not allow for the lifting of their political exclusion. The petit bourgeoisified civil war defeated, already incorporated in the market and the consumerist way of life, and demanded moral recognition and political representation.
But in vein, since the mode of political domination was placing obstacles in the mode of production (Charalambis 1989: 197-8, 224) leading to the generalized irrationality of the whole system. This blockage, manifesting the crisis of modernization and the prevention of the setting up of a new social contract, radicalized the EAMite petit bourgeois strata, as their fear gradually gave its place to resentful indignation. It was precisely because their social opportunities structure had changed and therefore they were able to express the accumulated emotional energy and transform the feeling of 10 For the concept of "cultural trauma", see Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, Sztompka (2004) .
Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc From the perspective of the political sociology of emotions, the seven years military regime had multiple effects. I will focus on one which I consider to be particularly significant in the context of my analysis: as one would expect, fear and insecurity returned to the left-leaning strata of the population who had staffed and socially supported EAM, EDA and EK. On top of the cultural trauma of the civil war, there now came the trauma of the imposition of dictatorship. So, there was formed a belief in the fatality of political inequality and marginalization and the impossibility of its overthrowing. The humiliation of the civil war"s defeated was not lifted but, on the contrary, accentuated. As a matter of fact, it was passed down to the next generation, which immediately after the dictatorship, constituted the new educated petit bourgeois strata (lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors in secondary education, etc.), which later supported with fervor Andreas Papandreou"s PASOK.
But at the same time, the majority of these strata, despite their increasing political marginalization, started gradually to accept the market economy in which they were Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -24 -Nicolas Demertzis becoming an active part, mainly in an extra-institutional way (gray-economy, tax evasion, etc.). Economic robustness did not go hand in hand with political and, in a wide sense, public recognition. For fifteen years (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , that is, even after the end of the dictatorship, «consciousness remained stuck to the past of political repression, while the specific practical behavior was already operating within the bounds of the market and the objective of economic profit».
So, the petit bourgeois strata found themselves in a societal field overdetermined by two contradictions: on the one hand there was the contradiction between political consciousness and actual economic behavior in real time, while on the other the demand for full fledged citizenship and the incapability of achieving it. These two contradictions had special repercussions on the affects of these strata, especially during the dictatorship. To begin with, in relation to the first contradiction, the increasing economic prosperity (privately owned flat, car, television, country house, etc.) relieved them from poverty and mainly from the fear of returning to their former condition of being a poor domestic migrant or a still poorer farmer. This relief strengthened the sense of security and the optimism as to the prospects of their socioeconomic position. But at the same time the trauma of defeat and the humiliation of political marginalization made them look and feel different from what they economically were. The trauma of the civil war and the dictatorship was not a past present, but a present past. That means that it is alive and produces feelings and attitudes, that do not "correspond" to the real economic condition and the consuming ability of the petit bourgeois subjects. Thus, unjustified complaining and selfvictimization is not rare in their daily encounters.
The peculiar outcome of the first contradiction supports the effect of the second: the contradiction between the desire for political and moral recognition and the Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -25 -Nicolas Demertzis powerlessness to impose it, combined with the chronic and traumatic reliving of endless vindictiveness, hostility, jealousy and indignation, produces ressentiment. I believe that Scheler"s analysis finds here an exemplary application. Political marginalization and the post-civil war establishment are now perceived as being an inescapable fate. There is not an active and energetic attitude in order to oppose the experienced injustice. Simultaneously, the petit bourgeois strata undergo a decisive transvaluation: while traditionally it is in their "nature" to orient themselves to the upper class, precisely because of their ressentiment, they now begin to evaluate those that are "below". Risking oversimplification, I would say that a significant portion of pre-dictatorial resentment qua moral indignation, during the dictatorship dematerializes and is transformed into ressentiment.
I am of the opinion that this psychic mechanism of transvaluation was the soil on which the post-dictatorial populism as ideology, movement and practice, flourished. I do not think that "the people" could be invested with mythical value that fast had it not previously been subjected to resentful transvaluation. Since the radicalized petit bourgeois strata could not become an "establishment" they elevated "the people" to the supreme legitimating and moral reference point. In other words, without being the only one, ressentiment functioned as a condition of possibility, paving the way for the formation of populism after the political changeover in 1974.
With PASOK"s rise to power the political opportunities structure for the petit bourgeois strata changed. Andreas Papandreou"s policies (the recognition of national resistance, a party clientelistic system) as well as his discourse on the advantaged and disadvantaged Greeks put ressentiment to the side. The changes in the political personnel and the governing system dragged the petit bourgeois strata out from political invisibility, something that in its turn functioned as a class-support for the power bloc, to use Nicos Poulantzas" concept. To a large degree, passive ressentiment gave its place to open vindictiveness: party mass clientelism (Lyrintzis 1984) and the "green-guards" (PASOK"s cadres who dominated in trade unions, the public sector and state mechanisms) were the compensation for the "stony years" of the political marginalization of the inheritors of the civil war. But yet again, the adversities were not conducted in terms of frontal and organized struggle. Populism was based on, and reproduced, the institutional informality and the anthropomorphism of Greek society.
However, the heritage of ressentiment during the dictatorship contributed to this: there was a rumination of negative feelings with unclear addressees. This has contributed to the diffuse disaffection of public against the way democracy is functioning in Greece as well as to the Greek"s widespread dissatisfaction with the overall way of life, documented in various comparative political surveys.
Conclusion
After discussing the relevance of emotions for the understanding of populism, in this paper I looked at the Greek case through a political sociology of emotion perspective using principally Max Scheler"s phenomenology of ressentiment. Based on Scheler"s theory, I tried to isolate and interpret the role of "ressentiment" in clearing the ground for the emergence of populism in post-authoritarian Greece. The rise of the Greek Socialists (PASOK) was buttressed, if not driven, by an array of emotions typical of populations undergoing rapid upward social mobility: repressed vindictiveness and vengeance, spite, envy and ressentiment. PASOK was heavily supported by new middle strata created by the defeated of the civil war .
Although they were more or less integrated socially and economically, until the mid "70s they were politically marginalized and dominated. During the seven years Emotions and PopulismFinal.doc -27 -Nicolas Demertzis military dictatorship their political marginalization was experienced as an inexorable destiny leading thereby to an experience of impotence and inferiority. In contradistinction to the 60s, where the defeated of the civil war articulated public grievances and demands out of resentment qua moral anger, during the dictatorship they developed a deep feeling of ressentiment. As soon as PASOK took office in 1981 and the lower middle strata (the "non privileged" in Andreas Papandreou"s rhetoric) found themselves integrated into the political system, ressentiment gave place to vengeance precisely because it could be released and acted out publicly.
All in all, it seems that the feeling of ressentiment grows, withdraws and is replaced by other feelings (fear, vindictiveness, indignation, etc.) , in an historical period of thirty years, contributing to the forming of collective identities and to the consolidation of political institutions and processes. However, my argument cannot but be a simplification since in real life feelings are in a constant flux and cannot be easily isolated.
